Applying Generate Random Extensions And Sustain Extensibility (GREASE) to TLS ExtensibilityGoogle LLCdavidben@google.com
General
TLSGREASEThis document describes GREASE (Generate Random Extensions And Sustain
Extensibility), a mechanism to prevent extensibility failures in the TLS
ecosystem. It reserves a set of TLS protocol values that may be advertised
to ensure peers correctly handle unknown values.Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are candidates for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any
errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
.
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Table of Contents
. Introduction
. Requirements Language
. GREASE Values
. Client-Initiated Extension Points
. Client Behavior
. Server Behavior
. Server-Initiated Extension Points
. Server Behavior
. Client Behavior
. Sending GREASE Values
. IANA Considerations
. Security Considerations
. Normative References
Acknowledgments
Author's Address
IntroductionThe TLS protocol includes several points of
extensibility, including the list of cipher suites and several lists of extensions.
The values transmitted in these lists identify implementation capabilities. TLS follows
a model where one side, usually the client, advertises capabilities, and the
peer, usually the server, selects them. The responding side must ignore unknown
values so that new capabilities may be introduced to the ecosystem while
maintaining interoperability.However, bugs may cause an implementation to reject unknown
values. It will interoperate with existing peers, so the mistake may
spread through the ecosystem unnoticed. Later, when new values are
defined, updated peers will discover that the metaphorical joint in the
protocol has rusted shut and the new values cannot be deployed without
interoperability failures.To avoid this problem, this document reserves some currently unused values for
TLS implementations to advertise at random. Correctly implemented peers will ignore
these values and interoperate. Peers that do not tolerate unknown values will
fail to interoperate, revealing the mistake before it is
widespread.In keeping with the rusted joint metaphor, this technique is called "GREASE"
(Generate Random Extensions And Sustain Extensibility).Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED",
"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14
when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
GREASE ValuesThis document reserves a number of TLS protocol values, referred to as
GREASE values. These values were allocated sparsely to discourage server
implementations from conditioning on them. For convenience, they were also
chosen so all types share a number scheme with a consistent pattern while
avoiding collisions with any existing applicable registries in TLS.The following values are reserved as GREASE values for cipher suites
and Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) identifiers:
{0x0A,0x0A}
{0x1A,0x1A}
{0x2A,0x2A}
{0x3A,0x3A}
{0x4A,0x4A}
{0x5A,0x5A}
{0x6A,0x6A}
{0x7A,0x7A}
{0x8A,0x8A}
{0x9A,0x9A}
{0xAA,0xAA}
{0xBA,0xBA}
{0xCA,0xCA}
{0xDA,0xDA}
{0xEA,0xEA}
{0xFA,0xFA}
The following values are reserved as GREASE values for extensions,
named groups, signature algorithms, and versions:
0x0A0A
0x1A1A
0x2A2A
0x3A3A
0x4A4A
0x5A5A
0x6A6A
0x7A7A
0x8A8A
0x9A9A
0xAAAA
0xBABA
0xCACA
0xDADA
0xEAEA
0xFAFA
The values allocated above are thus no longer available for use as TLS or
DTLS version numbers.The following values are reserved as GREASE values for PskKeyExchangeModes:
0x0B
0x2A
0x49
0x68
0x87
0xA6
0xC5
0xE4
Client-Initiated Extension PointsMost extension points in TLS are offered by the client and selected by
the server. This section details client and server behavior around
GREASE values for these.Client BehaviorWhen sending a ClientHello, a client MAY behave as follows:
A client MAY select one or more GREASE cipher suite values and advertise them in the "cipher_suites" field.
A client MAY select one or more GREASE extension values and advertise them as extensions with varying length and contents.
A client MAY select one or more GREASE named group values and advertise them in the "supported_groups" extension, if sent. It MAY also send KeyShareEntry values for a subset of those selected in the "key_share" extension. For each of these, the "key_exchange" field MAY be any value.
A client MAY select one or more GREASE signature algorithm values and advertise them in the "signature_algorithms" or "signature_algorithms_cert" extensions, if sent.
A client MAY select one or more GREASE version values and advertise them in the "supported_versions" extension, if sent.
A client MAY select one or more GREASE PskKeyExchangeMode values and advertise them in the "psk_key_exchange_modes" extension, if sent.
A client MAY select one or more GREASE ALPN identifiers and advertise them in the "application_layer_protocol_negotiation" extension, if sent.
Clients MUST reject GREASE values when negotiated by
the server. In particular, the client MUST fail the
connection if a GREASE value appears in any of the following:
The "version" value in a ServerHello or HelloRetryRequest
The "cipher_suite" value in a ServerHello
Any ServerHello extension
Any HelloRetryRequest, EncryptedExtensions, or Certificate extension in TLS 1.3
The "namedcurve" value in a ServerKeyExchange for an Ephemeral
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) cipher in TLS 1.2 or earlier
The signature algorithm in a ServerKeyExchange signature in TLS 1.2 or earlier
The signature algorithm in a server CertificateVerify signature in TLS 1.3
Note that this can be implemented without special processing on the client. The client
is already required to reject unknown server-selected values, so it
may leave GREASE values as unknown and reuse the existing logic.Server Behavior
When processing a ClientHello, servers MUST NOT treat GREASE values differently from any unknown value.
Servers MUST NOT negotiate any GREASE value when offered in a ClientHello.
Servers MUST correctly ignore unknown values in a ClientHello and attempt to negotiate with one of the remaining parameters.
(There may not be any known parameters remaining, in which case parameter negotiation will fail.)
Note that these requirements are restatements or corollaries of
existing server requirements in TLS.Server-Initiated Extension PointsSome extension points are offered by the server and selected by the
client. This section details client and server behavior around GREASE
values for these.Server BehaviorWhen sending a CertificateRequest in TLS 1.3, a server MAY behave as follows:
A server MAY select one or more GREASE extension values and advertise them as extensions with varying length and contents.
A server MAY select one or more GREASE signature algorithm values and advertise them in the "signature_algorithms" or "signature_algorithms_cert" extensions, if present.
When sending a NewSessionTicket message in TLS 1.3, a server MAY select one or more GREASE extension values and advertise them as extensions with varying length and contents.Servers MUST reject GREASE values when negotiated by the client.
In particular, the server MUST fail the connection if a GREASE
value appears in any of the following:
Any Certificate extension in TLS 1.3
The signature algorithm in a client CertificateVerify signature
Note that this can be implemented without special processing on the server. The server
is already required to reject unknown client-selected values, so it
may leave GREASE values as unknown and reuse the existing logic.Client Behavior
When processing a CertificateRequest or NewSessionTicket, clients MUST NOT treat GREASE values differently from any unknown value.
Clients MUST NOT negotiate any GREASE value when offered by the server.
Clients MUST correctly ignore unknown values offered by the server and attempt to negotiate with one of the remaining parameters.
(There may not be any known parameters remaining, in which case parameter negotiation will fail.)
Note that these requirements are restatements or corollaries of
existing client requirements in TLS.Sending GREASE ValuesImplementations advertising GREASE values SHOULD select them at random.
This is intended to encourage implementations to ignore all unknown values
rather than any individual value. Implementations MUST honor protocol
specifications when sending GREASE values. For instance, forbids duplicate extension types within a single
extension block. Implementations sending multiple GREASE extensions in a single
block must therefore ensure the same value is not selected twice.Implementations SHOULD balance diversity in GREASE advertisements with determinism.
For example, a client that randomly varies GREASE value positions for each
connection may only fail against a broken server with some probability. This
risks the failure being masked by automatic retries. A client that positions
GREASE values deterministically over a period of time (such as a single
software release) stresses fewer cases but is more likely to detect bugs from
those cases.IANA ConsiderationsThis document updates the "TLS Cipher Suites" registry, available at
:
Additions to the TLS Cipher Suites Registry
Value
Description
DTLS-OK
Recommended
Reference
{0x0A,0x0A}
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
{0x1A,0x1A}
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
{0x2A,0x2A}
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
{0x3A,0x3A}
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
{0x4A,0x4A}
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
{0x5A,0x5A}
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
{0x6A,0x6A}
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
{0x7A,0x7A}
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
{0x8A,0x8A}
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
{0x9A,0x9A}
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
{0xAA,0xAA}
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
{0xBA,0xBA}
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
{0xCA,0xCA}
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
{0xDA,0xDA}
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
{0xEA,0xEA}
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
{0xFA,0xFA}
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
This document updates the "TLS Supported Groups" registry, available at
:
Additions to the TLS Supported Groups Registry
Value
Description
DTLS-OK
Recommended
Reference
2570
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
6682
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
10794
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
14906
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
19018
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
23130
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
27242
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
31354
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
35466
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
39578
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
43690
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
47802
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
51914
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
56026
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
60138
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
64250
Reserved
Y
N
[RFC8701]
This document updates the "TLS ExtensionType Values" registry, available at
:
Additions to the TLS ExtensionType Values Registry
Value
Extension Name
TLS 1.3
Recommended
Reference
2570
Reserved
CH, CR, NST
N
[RFC8701]
6682
Reserved
CH, CR, NST
N
[RFC8701]
10794
Reserved
CH, CR, NST
N
[RFC8701]
14906
Reserved
CH, CR, NST
N
[RFC8701]
19018
Reserved
CH, CR, NST
N
[RFC8701]
23130
Reserved
CH, CR, NST
N
[RFC8701]
27242
Reserved
CH, CR, NST
N
[RFC8701]
31354
Reserved
CH, CR, NST
N
[RFC8701]
35466
Reserved
CH, CR, NST
N
[RFC8701]
39578
Reserved
CH, CR, NST
N
[RFC8701]
43690
Reserved
CH, CR, NST
N
[RFC8701]
47802
Reserved
CH, CR, NST
N
[RFC8701]
51914
Reserved
CH, CR, NST
N
[RFC8701]
56026
Reserved
CH, CR, NST
N
[RFC8701]
60138
Reserved
CH, CR, NST
N
[RFC8701]
64250
Reserved
CH, CR, NST
N
[RFC8701]
This document updates the "TLS Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation
(ALPN) Protocol IDs" registry, available at
:
Additions to the TLS Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation
(ALPN) Protocol IDs Registry
Protocol
Identification Sequence
Reference
Reserved
0x0A 0x0A
[RFC8701]
Reserved
0x1A 0x1A
[RFC8701]
Reserved
0x2A 0x2A
[RFC8701]
Reserved
0x3A 0x3A
[RFC8701]
Reserved
0x4A 0x4A
[RFC8701]
Reserved
0x5A 0x5A
[RFC8701]
Reserved
0x6A 0x6A
[RFC8701]
Reserved
0x7A 0x7A
[RFC8701]
Reserved
0x8A 0x8A
[RFC8701]
Reserved
0x9A 0x9A
[RFC8701]
Reserved
0xAA 0xAA
[RFC8701]
Reserved
0xBA 0xBA
[RFC8701]
Reserved
0xCA 0xCA
[RFC8701]
Reserved
0xDA 0xDA
[RFC8701]
Reserved
0xEA 0xEA
[RFC8701]
Reserved
0xFA 0xFA
[RFC8701]
Security ConsiderationsGREASE values cannot be negotiated, so they do not directly impact the
security of TLS connections.Historically, when interoperability problems arise in deploying new TLS
features, implementations have used a fallback retry on error with the
feature disabled. This allows an active attacker to silently disable the
new feature. By preventing a class of such interoperability problems,
GREASE reduces the need for this kind of fallback. Implementations SHOULD NOT retry with GREASE disabled on connection failure. While allowing an
attacker to disable GREASE is unlikely to have immediate security
consequences, such a fallback would prevent GREASE from defending against
extensibility failures.If an implementation does not select GREASE values at random, it is
possible it will allow for fingerprinting of the implementation or
perhaps even of individual users. This can result in a negative impact to
a user's privacy.Normative ReferencesKey words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement LevelsIn many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. [STANDARDS-TRACK]Datagram Transport Layer Security Version 1.2This document specifies version 1.2 of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. The DTLS protocol provides communications privacy for datagram protocols. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. The DTLS protocol is based on the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol and provides equivalent security guarantees. Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are preserved by the DTLS protocol. This document updates DTLS 1.0 to work with TLS version 1.2. [STANDARDS-TRACK]Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation ExtensionThis document describes a Transport Layer Security (TLS) extension for application-layer protocol negotiation within the TLS handshake. For instances in which multiple application protocols are supported on the same TCP or UDP port, this extension allows the application layer to negotiate which protocol will be used within the TLS connection.Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key WordsRFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank , , and for their
feedback and suggestions. In addition, the rusted joint metaphor is originally
due to .
Author's AddressGoogle LLCdavidben@google.com